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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DALE W. DeMILLE,
Administrator df the Estate
of Terry Lee DeMille and
Constance Hope DeMille,
also known as Connie DeMille,
deceased,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
-vsPHYLLIS ERICKSON,
Administratrix of the Estate of
Frederick Kenneth Spendlove,
deceased,
Defendant and
Appellant.

Case No.
11,385

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by Dale W. DeMille
as Administrator of the Estate of 'Terry DeMille and
Constance DeMille to recover damages for their alleged wrongful death from the defendant, Phyllis
Erickson, Administratrix of the Estate of Frederick
Kenneth Spendlove. The action arose out of an automobile accident which occurred in Iron County on
the 11th day of August, 1965, in which Terry DeMille, Constance Hope DeMille and Frederick Kenneth Spendlove were killed.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury before the Honm·.
able C. Nelson Day in the District Court in and for
Iron County. At the close of the evidence, both parties
made motions for directed verdicts. The court ruled
that the plaintiff could not recover for the wrongful
death of Terry Lee DeMille on the ground that he
was negligent as a matter of law in the operation of
his vehicle at the time and place of the accident in
question and that his negligence was a contributing
and proximate cause of his own death. The court denied the motions for directed verdicts in the action
brought for the alleged wrongful death of Constance
Hope DeMille.
The court submitted the case to the jury under
an instruction (Instruction 24), which contained
five separate issues of negligence on the part of Fred·
erick Kenneth Spendlove, the driver of the other automobile: that he failed to maintain a proper lookout;
failed to keep the car under reasonably safe and prop·
er control; failed to drive as nearly as practical en·
tirely within a single lane and not to move from one
lane to another; failed to keep his automobile on his
own right side of the highway; and failed to turn his
vehicle to the outside of the highway to avoid a col·
lision. Appellant objected to this instruction on the
grounds there was no evidence of negligence on the
part of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove and that in the
absence of such evidence he was entitled to a pre·
sumption that he was using due care. The jury re·
2

solved the issues in favor of the plaintiff and rendered a judgment in the amount of $23,000.00 which
was entered by the court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON
Appellant, Phyllis Erickson,
the Estate of Frederick Kenneth
reversal of the judgment entered
or in the alternative a new trial.

APPEAL
Administratrix of
Spendlove, seeks a
in the lower court

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case indicate that the deceaseds,
Terry Lee DeMille and Constance Hope DeMille,
were husband and wife (TR. 6). They resided in
Cedar City, Utah (TR. 8). Approximately one week
prior to the accident, Terry had been laid off from his
work at the Webster Coal Company. On the day of
the accident, August 11, 1965, he was on his way to
see about a job in Las Vegas, Nevada (TR. 13).
Terry and his wife were seen at a service station in
Cedar City the morning of the accident between 6 :30
and 6:40 a.m. (TR. 15). At that time Terry was sitting in the driver's seat of a Chevrolet automobile
and his wife was in the front seat on the right side
(TR. 16). They were next seen at the scene of the
accident just south of Kanarraville, Utah, or approximately 13or14 miles south of Cedar City (TR. 17).
At 6 :55 a.m. Officer William R. Burch of the
Utah Highway Patrol received a call reporting an
automobile accident jus't south of Kanarraville, Utah.
He immediately drove to the scene of the accident,
3

arriving at 7 :05 a.m. He was the first officer to ar.
rive on the scene which was about a mile south of
Kanarraville, Utah, on Highway 91. This was the
highway in normal use between points to the south of
Cedar City. At the time the freeway had not been
opened to the public (TR. 24) . He first checked the
people who had been involved in the accident and
identified a 1962 Volkswagen. There were two people
lying near this vehicle later identified as Frederick
Kenneth Spendlove and a Mr. Condie. Both in his
opinion were dead (TR. 25) . He then identified a
Chevrolet automobile in which there was a man and
woman, later identified as Terry DeMille and his
wife Constance DeMille (TR. 26). In his opinion
Terry DeMille was still breathing at the time but expired shortly thereafter (TR. 26). He called for assistance and an ambulance and then proceeded to
make his investigation which can best be understood
by referring to Exhibits No. 5 and 6, which we have
reproduced and which appear on the following pages
of this brief. Exhibit 5 is a diagram of the scene of
the accident and Exhibit 6 is a photograph of the
same area.
The highway extends in a generally north and
south direction. The overall width of the highway
was 31 feet (TR. 27). It was marked by a dotted
or dashed white line down the approximate center of
the highway. The distance from the center of the
highway to the east edge of the highway was 16 feet
4 inches (TR. 29). There was a solid yellow line in
4
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the south bond lane of traffic west of the dotted or
dashed white line (TR. 30). The Volkswagen automobile ended up off of the east side of the road in the
position illustrated as point No. 3 on Exhibit 5 and 6.
To the north of these vehicles various skid marks,
scrapes and gouges felt to be of critical importance
in reconstructing the accident were found. The farthest mark north in the north bound lane of traffic
was a rubber scuff mark about 20 inches in diameter.
The outside edge of this mark was 60 inches east of
the white line. The center of this mark was 49 inches
east of the white line (TR. 32, 33).

Between the mark identified as point No. 1 and
the white line down the center of the highway there
were a number of gouge marks. One of these, the one
that is closest to the center line, was identified on
Exhibits 5 and 6 as point No. 6. This mark was app1·oximately 18 inches south of the mark found at
point No. 1 (TR. 93) and approximately 2Y2 inches
east of the white line (TR. 54). This mark in the
opinion of Officer Burch was made by some metal
part of the Volkswagen, probably the left front wheel
(TR. 93). In the opinion of Officer Reed it was made
by the collapsation of the undercarriage of the front
left of the Volkswagen (TR. 169) which would include the axles, shock absorbers, and the wheels (TR.
in, 17 4). Approximately 105 inches south of point
No. l a rubber skid mark was found leading diagon5

ally off to the east side of the road to the final resting
place of the Volkswagen (TR. 36, 37) which came to
rest at the point illustrated on Exhibits 5 and 6 as
point No. 3. This mark in the opinion of Officer
Burch was made by one of 'the rear tires of the Volkswagen prior to the time it left the road (TR. 85). On
the east edge of the highway near point No. 3 there
were scuff or tire marks made by the underpart of
the Volkswagen automobile as it left the highway
('TR. 137). Further sou'th and beginning at what has
been shown as point No. 7 on Exhibit 5 and leading to
the right front of the Chevrolet automobile which
has been shown as point No. 8 on Exhibit 5 there was
a mark extending in a circular fashion ('TR. 74). To
the south of this mark being at a point identified as
point No. 4 on Exhibits 5 and 6 and leading to the
Chevrolet automobile which has been identified as
point No. 5, there were two rubber skid marks which
begin near the center of the road (TR. 45) and lead
up to the Chevrolet (TR. 40). All of the marks found
by the officers were on the east side of the highway
with the exception of the marks running from point
No. 2 to 3 which start on the west side near the center
of the road (TR. 76). There is an oil slick in the vicinity of point No. 6 which the officers said had noth·
ing to do with this accident (TR. 78). There appear
to be some blotches or blotchy areas on the west side
of the highway which according to the officers do not
tie in or have anything to do with this accident (TR.
78).
6

A car going south from Cedar City would be on
the west side of the highway and a car going north
or towards Cedar City would be on the east side of
the highway (TR. 76). The front end of the Chevrolet automobile was extensively damaged (see plaintiff's Exhibit No. 12 and defendant's Exhibit No. 3).
The front of the Volkswagen automobile was practically obliterated (see plaintiff's Exhibit No. 11). The
point of maximum engagement on the front of the
Chevrolet automobile was from a little bit right of
the center of the automobile to the left side of the car
(TR. 95) , an area of approximately four feet in
length (TR. 96).
The area where the impact between the two
automobiles occurred was identified on Exhibit 5 by
the red circle drawn in the area which was previously
identified as point No. 6. Actually point No. 6 is in
the opinion of Officer Reed, one of the investigating
officers, anywhere from six inches to two feet from
the point where the automobiles first came together.
Other than the foregoing physical facts, there is no
evidence in the record as to what the drivers of the
two vehicles were doing at the time of the accident,
whether they saw one another, the speed at which
they were driving, what evasive action they may or
may not have taken prior to the accident, or any other
informa!tion as to how the accident in this case may
have occurred.
Based on these physical facts and the inference
that the DeMille car was travelling south, since it
7

was travelling away from Cedar City, the two highway patrolmen who testified in the case, William R.
Burch and Robert J. Reed, both of whom were called
by the plainltiff, attempted to reconstruct the accident and arrived at certain conclusions. Based on the
gouge marks, the area designated as the point of impact, the damage to the front end of the Volkswagen,
and the damage to the front end of the Chevrole1t automobile, Officer Burch testified that in his opinion the
DeMille or Chevrolet automobile was about three to
four feet across the white line into the north bound
lane of traffic at the time of the impact (TR. 97).
He further testified that the 1962 Volkswagen automobile had an overall width from one side to 'the other
of sixty inches and a width from the outside of the
tire on the right to the outside of the tire on the left
df 56 inches (TR. 54), so that on each side beyond
the outer rim of the tire there would be two inches to
the outside skirt of the car. The 1962 Volkswagen
weighed approximately 1800 pounds. The Chevrolet
automobile had an overall weight of between 3,500
and 4,000 pounds. He further testified that on the
basis of the physical evidence which he found at the
scene of the accident, the Volkswagen automobile
would be 21;2 inches east of the center of the white
line (TR. 90) and that he found no evidence whatsoever indicating that the Volkwagen or Spendlove
vehicle ever got on to the wrong side of the road. He
stated that as the two automobiles came together the
left side of the Chevrolet automobile came up over
8

the Volkwagen. At that point the rear of the Chevrolet automobile swung in a counter-clockwise direction to the west side of the road and continued on
around until it came to the point indicated as point
No. 4 where the rear wheels engaged the highway. At
this point the front of the Chevrolet automobile starts
to swing in a clockwise direction, the right front
wheel of the car engaging the highway at point No. 7
and making the marks shown on the exhibits between
poinlt No. 7 and No. 8, the vehicle coming to rest with
the front end again facing toward the south (TR.
101). At the same time the front end of the Volkswagen was forced down onto the highway making the
marks shown on Exhibits 5 and 6 as points 1 and 6.
At that point the front end of the Volkswagen was
facing toward the center of the road. The rear of the
Volkswagen then moved in a counter-clockwise direction towards the east, the north, the west, and back
to the south making almost a 180° circle to where the
rear of the Volkswagen engaged the road at point No.
2 on Exhibit 5 and 6 (TR. 180, 101, 108). At that
point the rear wheels of the automobile, and the
Volkswagen skidded around in a clockwise direction
making the scuff marks on the edge of the road in
the area near point No. 3 and came to rest with the
front of the Volkswagen pointing in a southeast direction at point No. 3 (TR. 127 through 129).
1

One of the contentions of the plaintiff is that the
mark shown at point No. 2 which is one foot seven
inches onto the west side of the road was made by the
9

Volkswagen automobile at the time of impact an<l
illustrates that it was on the wrong side of the road
at that time and that this mark was made by the rear
of the Volkswagen automobile as it was simply pushed off of the road. Referring to the mark leading
from point No. 2 to 3 (TR. 133), the officer was asked:
Now, counsel has asked you, could this
have been made by the car being pushed
sideways off the road, and your answer
to that is yes, it could have been so made,
possibility?
A. Yes.
Q. But that is not your opinion as to how it
was made?
A. No." (TR. 134)
And again on page 135 of the transcript the officer
was asked:

"Q.

"Q.

Let me ask you this, in the realm of pos·
sibilities: Assume that this tire was leftwell, let me put it this way, assume that
when the car was forced to the ground,
one wheel was there (indicating) and one
wheel was there, (indicating) is there
any possibility, then, that that car, that
the left rear of that car could have made
that tire mark as it went off the road; if
we assume we started with the car hitting
the ground, the wheels hitting the ground
in that position (indicating) anil then
being forced off the road, is there any pos·
sibility that that mark could have b.een
made by the left rear wheels of the tires
10

when it was forced off the road?
A. No."
Both officers concurred in their analysis of how
the Volkswagen swung around first to the east, then
the north, west, and then south in a counter-clockwise
direction (TR. 101, 180).
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT
A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT

It has already been shown that there was no evidence produced at the trial relative to the acts and
conduct of the deceased, Frederick Kenneth Spendlove, immediately before the collision. Except for the
fact that Terry Lee DeMille and Constance DeMille
were seen in Cedar City fifteen to twenty minutes
prior to the accident and were then intending to go
to Las Vegas, Nevada, nothing is known concerning
the events leading up to the collision. All of the persons involved in the collision were killed, and there
were no eye witnesses.

Where there are no eye witnesses or other evidence of negligence on the part of the deceased, the
general rule is stated in Blashfield Automobile Law
And Practice, Section 417.2, Volume 11, as follows:
"In the absence of any evidence as to the conduct of deceased, in most jurisdictions, in view
of the instinct of self-preservation, there is a
presumption that the deceased, whether an
adult or a minor, was in the exercise of ordinary care at the time of an automobile accident.
This includes the presumption of due obser11

vance of deceased of the traffic laws. The presumption is that the deceased did what a prudent man would have done under the circumstances until the accident occurred."
The rule that in the absence of evidence to the contrary it would be presumed that a deceased person
was exercising due care has been dealt with by this
Court in several cases: Tuttle vs. PIE, 242 Pac. 2d
764, 121 U 418, 121 U 420; Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, 249
Pac. 2d 213, 122 U 312; Mecham vs. Allen, 262 Pac.
2d 285, 1 U 2d 79; Okuda vs. Rose, 5 Utah 2d 39, 296
Pac. 2d 287.
We conceive the doctrine of those cases to be that
a deceased person is presumed to be in the exercise of
due care (the presumed fact), which presumption
arises from the fact that he has been killed (the basic
fact) . The presumed fact remains in the case until
the party who has the burden of proving the non·
existence of the presumed fact produces prima facie
evidence to the contrary. If that burden is not dis·
charged, the presumed fact remains in the case and
the court should instruct the jury on it or direct a
verdict in accordance with that presumption.
In the Mecham case, supra, Justice Wade ex·
plains the effect of the presumption as follows:
"Such a presumption deals only with the bur·
den of going forward with or the production of
evidence. The question of whether a prill!a
f acie case has been made is the same here as Ill
all other cases - a question for the court and
not the jury to determine. It is established
12

whenever sufficient evidence is produced from
which its existence could be reasonably found.
Of course it is immaterial which party produces such evidence. If the court concludes
that a prima facie case has been made it should
submit the question of the existence of the presumed fact to the jury on the evidence without
commenting on or mentioning to them that
there was or is such a presumption. If the court
concludes that no prima facie showing of the
non-existence of the presumed facts has been
made he should direct the jury to assume the
existence of the presumed facts, or if such
facts are determinative of the whole case he
should direct a verdict in accordance therewith."
Actually as was pointed out in Okuda vs. Rose,
supra, this is simply to say that the person who
charges negligence on the part of another has the
burden of proving such negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. In the Okuda case the question
was whether or not the plaintiff who was deceased
was guilty of contributory negligence and an instruction on the presumption that she was exercising due
care was not given. The court said:
"As to the first point on appeal plaintiffs were
not entitled to instruction that the decedent
was presumed to be acting with due care for
her own safety. The trial court instructed that
the defendant had the burden of proving his
affirmative assertion of contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, and
it has been indicated that there is no need to
give an instruction to emphasize the burden of
going forward with the evidence where defen13

dan t also has the burden of persuasion as
here."
The courts have formulated the rule that negligence is never to be presumed but must be established,
and until established by competent evidence the jury
has no function to perform, Goheen vs. Graber, 309
Pac. 2d 636 (Kansas). It has also been held that it
is not within the jury's province to indulge in mere
speculation or conjecture with respect to the issue of
negligence, and a verdict cannot be predicted on mere
speculation or conjecture respecting the vital issue,
Modelin vs. Consumers Coop Association, 241 Pac.
2d 693 (Kansas). The case particularly in point is
Aagard vs. Dayton & Miller Red-E-Mix Concrete
Company, 12 Utah 2d 34, 361 Pac. 2d 582. In this
case the facts were as stated in the case:
~'Plaintiff's sheep truck was traveling westerly down the canyon; and defendant's cement
truck was traveling easterly up it, although
the road from both direc'tions is slightly downgrade approaching the underpass. Plaintiff's
driver, Clifford Bloomquist, testified that as
he neared the underpass he saw the cement
truck coming about 200 feet away, astride the
center line, but that as it came on it appeared
to be moving back toward its side of the highway; while the defendant, Thomas Cook, driver of the cement truck, admits that the sheep
truck appeared to be on its own side when he
first observed it, and does not claim to have
seen it over the center line. He said he realized
the trucks were going to be close as they passed
but did not expect any collision.
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"The trucks were not afoul each other as their
front portions passed. The defendant's rear
view mirror, which extends just beyond the
width of the cement truck on the driver's side,
was not touched. But the trucks apparently
came closer together as they continued passing
each other because from about half way back
the paint on the cement truck was scraped by
the rack of the sheep truck."
The case was tried to the court without a jury,
who rendered a judgment for defendant. The plaintiff appealed attacking the findings of judgment as
being against the evidence. The court held :
"Even if the plaintiff is correct in arguing
that certain aspects of the evidence tend to
favor his claim that his driver was in the right,
that is not enough to justify upsetting the
judgment. As plaintiff he had the burden of
proving his right to recover by a preponderance of the evidence."
There is an annotation on the sufficiency of evidence, in the absence of survivors or of eye witnesses
competent to testify, as to the place or point of impact
of motor vehicles going in opposite directions and involved in a collision in 77 ALR 2d at page 576. A review of the annotation discloses that such evidence in
and of itself has been held sufficient to sustain averdict in some cases and insufficient in other cases. A
reading of those cases will illustrate that all the
courts agree that there must be sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a verdict and that each
case can be distinguished by the physical evidence
15

found in that particular case. For the reason that in
none of those cases is the physical evidence the same
as in this case, we see no point in burdening the court
with an analysis of each particular case. The rule by
which the evidence should be measured is set out in
Bokhoven vs. Hull, 1956, 247 Iowa 604, 75 N.W. 2d
225, cited on page 582 of the annotation, where it was
held:
"That circumstantial evidence need not be so
clear as to exclude every possibility other than
'the one relied upon, but must be clear enough
to make that theory more reasonably probable
than any other hypothesis based on the evidence."
In the case which we are considering there is no
evidence other than the damage to the vehicles, the
highway itself, and the marks found upon the highway. All of the marks found on the highway are on
the defendant's side of the road with the exception
of the mark made by the rear wheel of the Volks·
wagen automobile which begins one foot seven inches
to the west of the white line and then extends across
the whi'te line onto the east side of the road and off
to where the Volkswagen came to rest. Plaintiff will
probably claim that that mark alone is sufficient evi·
dence upon which to base a verdict, contending that
that mark was made by the Volkswagen at the mo·
ment of impact as the Volkswagen was pushed off of
the highway by the Chevrolet automobile. An analysis
of all the marks on the highway and the physical dam·
age to both of the automobiles will show that the
16

Volkswagen automobile could not possibly have made
the mark on the highway found at points 1 and 6 and
have made the mark running from point 2 to 3 at the
same time. Both of the police officers who were called
by the plaintiff and who have some degree of expertness in investigating accidents were of the opinion
that the marks at point 1 and point 6 of the diagram
(Exhibit 5) and the photograph (Exhibit 6) were
made by the Volkswagen automobile as it was forced
onto the pavement at the time of impact, and that the
mark found at point 2 and running to point 3 was
made by the Volkswagen automobile after the impact
and after the Volkswagen automobile had swung
around in a 180 ° circle where the back wheels came to
rest upon the pavement. No one except plain'tiff's attorney ever hypothecated that the mark found at
point 2 and extending to point 3 was made at the time
of impact. So it is seen under the tests which we have
previously set out that the plaintiff's theory of causation is not the more reasonably probable but in the
opinion of one of the investigating officers considering all of the physical evidence is impossible.
The opinion of the only officer who was ever
asked the question as to whether or not the Volkswagen automobile got onto the wrong side of the road
was that it did not. What we then have is an impact
between two automobiles which it appears were traveling in opposite directions, which occurred near 'the
white line down the center of the highway. The Chev1·0Iet or DeMille automobile at that point was 3% to
17

4 feet onto the wrong side of the road. The Spendlove
or Volkswagen automobile was at the least two inches
from the center of the white line onto its own side of
the road. From this the only inference that can be
made is that Terry DeMille was partially onto the
wrong side of the road a't the time of the accident and
that this was a proximate cause of the collision. It
cannot be presumed from this evidence alone that
either of the vehicles were traveling in excess of the
speed limit or at an unreasonably high rate of speed.
It cannot be presumed from this evidence that they
should have seen one another in time to avoid the accident. It cannot be inferred from this evidence that
they had a reasonable opportunity to take some evasive action to avoid the accident. As will be illustrated
further on in our argument, both parties could have
been observing a proper lookout, driving at areasonable rate of speed with their cars under reasonable control, and this accident nevertheless have happened. It, therefore, appears that there was simply
no competent evidence on which the lower court could
submit the question of negligence on the part of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove to the jury since there was
no evidence from which a jury could infer negligence
on his part.
That the court committed further error in the
manner in which it submitted this case to the jury is
the substance of Point II. of the argument of this
brief.
18

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 24 PERTAINING TO NEGLIGENCE

As pointed out in our argument under Point I,
the only established fact in this case relative to the
conduct of the drivers of the vehicles is that the collision between the two vehicles occurred at or near
the white line down the highway on Spendlove's side
of the road. The court nevertheless gave its Instruction No. 24 pertaining to negligence on the part of the
defendant to which the defendant duly accepted (TR.
253). Said instruction reads as follows:
"Instruction No. 24
"It was the duty of the decedent Frederick Kenneth Spendlove to use reasonable care
under the circumstances in driving his car to
avoid danger to himself and o'thers and to observe and be aware of the condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, and other existing
conditions; in that regard, he was obligated:
'"A. To use reasonable care to keep a lookout for other vehicles and obstacles or other
conditions reasonably to be anticipated.
"B. To keep his car under reasonably safe
and proper control.
"C. Upon a laned highway to drive as
nearly as practicable entirely within a single
lane and not to move from one lane to another
until the driver has first ascertained that he
can do so with reasonable safety.
"D. To drive his automobile on his own
right side that is, the east side of the highway.
19

"E. To keep a lookout for persons and
other vehicles upon the highway, and whenever it appears to be reasonably necessary in
the exercise of due care for the safety of himself or others, to turn his vehicle to the outside
of the highway to avoid a collision.
"Failure of the said Frederick Kenneth
Spendlove to operate his automobile in accordance with the foregoing requirements of the
law would constitute negligence on his part."
Under this Instruction the jury were at liberty
to find negligence on the part of Frederick Kenneth
Spendlove on any one or more of five grounds: First,
they might return a verdict against his estate if he
failed to maintain a proper lookout; second, if he
failed to keep his car under reasonably safe and proper control (whatever that means) ; third, if they
found he was traveling upon a laned highway (which
he was not) and did not drive as nearly as practicable
entirely within a single lane and did move from one
lane to another without first ascertaining that he
could do so with reasonable safety; fourth, that he
drove his automobile onto the wrong side of the road;
and fifth, that he failed to turn his vehicle to the outside of a highway to avoid a collision. The jury could
have easily have been sufficiently impressed with the
instruction to believe that there was evidence in the
record from which they could find that Frederick
Kenneth Spendlove was negligent in one or more of
the ways mentioned. They would be entitled to assume that there must have been evidence in the record
or the court would not have given the instruction. It
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is for these reasons that courts have declared that
such abstractions constitute reversible error.

See Corpus Juris Secundum, Trial, Section 379,
Volume 88.
"Instructions should be concrete and specific
as possible with respect to the facts and issues
of the case, and not general or abstract, and it
is improper to give an instruction announcing
a naked legal proposition, however correct it
may be, unless it bears on, and is connected
with the issues involved, and unless, further
there has been some competent evidence to
which the jury may apply it."
This statement of law is further developed in succeeding sections in that volume and is supported by
many cases.
In Hadley vs. Wood, 345 Pac. 2d 197, 9 Utah 2d
336, an action for personal injuries sustained by the
plaintiff when a sleigh upon which he was riding slid
into the path of defendant's automobile, this court
said:
'''In the second place an instruction may be entirely accurate as a general statement of law
and yet be erroneous if applied to special fact
situations ... It is not the function of the court
to recite to the jury propositions of law in the
abstract, however accurate or even interesting
they may be. It is worse than idle to do so. By
including irrelevancies the process could go on
interminably with the result not only of boring
but likely of confusing the jury. It seems hardly necessary to reiterate the idea also included
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in the preface to JIFU, '... the fewer instructions given, the better ... no instruction should
be given unless it is both necessary and applicable to the fact situation at hand'."
It is also well settled that the court may not permit the jury to speculate upon the evidence and that
a finding of fact cannot be based upon surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation, Jackson vs. Colston,
116 Utah 205, 209 Pac. 2d 566; Dern Investment
Company vs. Carbon County Land Company, 94
Utah 76, 75 Pac. 2d 660.

The general proposition that it is prejudicial
error for a trial court to give instructions on matters
extraneous to the issues and evidence of the case notwithstanding that such instructions may correctly
state the law has been stated in numerous cases by
this court. In that connection see Shields vs. Utah
Light and Traction Company, 99 Utah 307, 105 Pac.
2d 347; Parker vs. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116
Pac. 2d 425; Morrison vs. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140
Pac. 2d 772; Corey vs. Southern Pacific Company,
119 Utah 1, 223 Pac. 2d 819; Olson vs. Warwod, 123
Utah 111, 225 Pac. 2d 725; Moore vs. Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad, 292 Pac. 2d 849, 4 Utah
2d 255; and Johnson vs. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268,
342 Pac. 2d 984.
In the case of Morrison vs. Perry, supra, the de·
fendant was driving from Deweyville which is on the
highway north of Ogden to Ogden. As they approach·
ed the scene of the accident about 7 :00 o'clock a.m.
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it was light and visibility was good and defendant
was proceeding at 35 to 40 miles per hour. As his
car approached the point where the main and old
highway separate, he saw the deceased's car approaching from the south on the main highway but
could not tell on which side of the road he was until
they were within 225 feet of each other at which time
they noticed the deceased was on the wrong side of
the highway on the inside of a curve headed toward
the right side of defendant's automobile. The defendant immediately swung his car to the left and applied his brakes. At the same instant the deceased
swung his car to the right. Defendant's car had almost come to a stop when the collision occurred near
the edge of the hard surface of the old highway on defendant's left hand side and near the point of divergence of the highways. Both cars were travelling at
about the same rate of speed. The complaint was
made of the instructions and the trial court said, on
page 776 of the Pacific Reporter:
trial court instructed a jury on all the
alleged grounds of negligence set forth in
plaintiff's complaint. One of the grounds was
that the defendant drove his car 'without having it under immediate control, so he could
stop it within the range of his vision.' The
court should not have submitted this issue to
the jury where there was no evidence to support it and it was not applicable in this case."
In the case of Johnson vs. Maynard, supra, it
was held in an action for injuries suffered by the
plaintiff when her automobile was struck by an of~'·The
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ficial police vehicle, driven by the defendant, in an
intersection in the downtown business area that in
the absence of a showing ( 1) that plaintiff had been
aware of particular dangers involved in approach
of defendant's vehicle and (2) that, having such
knowledge, she had nevertheless assumed the risk of
such danger and proceeded, had rendered the doctrine
of assumption of risk inapplicable; and held that error in instructing on that doctrine would require reversal, since jury could have believed from instruction
that plaintiff would be barred from recovery by assumption of risk even if she had exercised due care
under the circumstances.
In the case of Shields vs. Utah Light and Traction Company, supra, the court read the pleadings to
the jury as part of the instructions. In sub-paragraph
9 of the instruction the jury was advised (by way of
setting forth just what plaintiff contended the facts
showed) that at the time of his death (as a result of
the action in question) "He was an employee of the
Tooele Valley Railway Company in Salt Lake City,
Utah, and was earning a salary of $77.50 a month
and was promised by said employer, and upon said
promises it is therefore alleges that his salary would
rapidly increase until he would be earning approximately $200.00 per month." The court held:
"We conclude that the reading of the long and
involved Complaint to the jury as part of the
charge was error not altogether corrected by
the mere admonition that the foregoing is not
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to be considered as evidence but merely sets
forth the claims of the plaintiff. Likewise, setting forth the plaintiff's theory in Instruction
1, that the deceased would soon have been earning $200.00 per month, was error for the reason that there was no evidence offered to support such allegation."
For the jury to find in this case that Frederick
Kenneth Spendlove was not keeping a proper lookout
prior to the time of the collision, the jury would have
to assume that the DeMille automobile drove down
the highway on the wrong side of the road or in a
manner otherwise constituting a threat to Kenneth
Spendlove for a sufficient length of time for Frederick Kenneth Spendlove to have seen the vehicle and
appraise the situation, and then to have done something about it. For the jury to have found that Spendlove was negligent for failing to turn his vehicle to
the outside of the highway to avoid a collision assumes first of all that he saw the car or should have
seen the car approaching him on the wrong side of
the highway for a sufficient length of time to have
done something about it, but also that that car was
during that period of time approaching in such a
manner as to have made a turn to the outside of the
highway advisable. The charge that Frederick Kenneth Spendlove may have been negligent if he failed
to keep his car under reasonably safe and proper control presumes that he had an opportunity to avoid the
accident and could have avoided it had his car been
under reasonably safe and proper control. We have
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already pointed out that there was no evidence that
Spendlove drove his car on the wrong side of the road i
which would make this part of the instruction inap-1
plicable. It is much more probable, unless we want to
assume the drivers wanted to commit suicide, that
the DeMille automobile came over onto the wrong
side of the highway suddenly - perhaps he turned
out to pass a car or some such thing - and there was
nothing either driver could do at that point. The point
we are trying to make is illustrated by the case of
Baumler vs. Hazelwood (Texas, 1961) 347 S.W. 2d
560. This was a wrongful death action arising out of
a head-on collision on an open highway. In the words
of the court:
"The accident occurred about 1 :30 a.m.
on Sunday morning. The night was clear and
bright. There was a moon. The highway, U.S.
Highway 77, was a concrete two-lane highway
with a white line painted down the center and
clearly visible. At the point of collision, the
highway was smooth, straight, and level. There
were gravel shoulders 6 or 8 feet wide leading
into ditches on both sides of the highway. The
highway runs north and south.
''Baumler was driving north from Dallas
in the east lane of the highway. Hazelwood, ~c
companied by a female companion, was dr1v·
ing in the opposite direction, i.e., south toward
Dallas. Their cars collided, left-front. fen~er
to left front fender. Hazelwood was killed ind·
stantly. The lady accompanying Hazelwoo
did not take the witness stand. While Baumler
was permitted to testify about other matters,
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he was not permitted to testify as to the collision itself. The testimony was excluded by the
trial judge because of the provisions of the
Dead Man's Statute; i.e., that the accident was
a 'transaction with the deceased' under Article
3716, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes Annotated. 'The correctness of this ruling is not before
us. There were no other eyewitnesses. So the
evidence before us consists mainly of the condition of the cars, condition and acts of the parties before and after the collision, pictures taken at the scene, and the evidence left after the
crash.
" ... The jury found that Hazelwood failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to have
his car under proper control, both of which
were negligence and a proximate cause of the
collision. It found that Hazelwood did not fail
to turn his car to the right immediately before
the collision; but it found that immediately
prior to the collision, Hazelwood drove and
operated his car so that a portion thereof extended to his left-hand side of the center stripe
of the highway; and this was negligence and a
proximate cause. Those findings are not attacked.
"The jury found that Baumler did not fail
to keep a proper lookout; did not fail to keep
his car under proper control; and did not drive
or operate his car on his left-hand side of the
center line. It found, however, that he was
driving his car at a greater rate of speed than
a person of ordinary care and prudence would
have driven under the circumstances; and that
this was a proximate cause of the collision. It
also found that Baumler failed to turn his car
to the right immediately before the collision;
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and that this was negligence and a proximate
cause.
" ... As set out above, the jury found that
Hazelwood drove his car over into Baumler's
side of the road. It also found that Baumler did
not drive on the wrong side of the road. But
there is no evidence as to how far the two cars
were apart when Hazelwood drove onto Baumler's side, and there was no direct evidence of
the speed at which the cars were approaching
each other. We find no evidence that, including reaction time, Baumler had any opportunity to take evasive action by turning, speeding
up, or slowing down. The testimony regarding
skid marks or the lack of them need not be repeated except to observe this: there were none
according to the testimony of the sheriff's patrolman and other witnesses. There were tire
marks 'just before the point of impact' according to Roy Perry. And while Billy Gober said
that he did not remember well, he recalled 15
or 20 feet of marks on the east and about 10
feet on the west. Gober did not describe the
direction of the skid marks, except that they
were on one side or the other of the highway.
For that matter he did not testify who made
the skid marks.
" ... Under this evidence the jury would
have to speculate on the time and distance .factors. We find no evidence thereon. The JUl'Y
found that Baumler kept a proper lookout and
had his car under proper control. If, then,
Hazelwood suddenly drove onto Baumler's
side of the road and there was no time for
Baumler to evade him, Baumler would have
been hit, and he would have hit Hazelwood, at
whatever speed Baumler was traveling."
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Instruction 24 is erroneous in yet another regard, and that is that the charge that Frederick
Kenneth Spendlove had a duty "upon a laned highway to drive as nearly as practicable entirely within
a single lane and not to move from one lane to another
until the driver has first ascertained that he can do
so with reasonable safety" was not applicable unless
we consider this a laned highway. If we did consider
it a laned highway, then the charge that Frederick
Kenneth Spendlove had a duty to "drive his automobile on his own right side that is, the east side of the
highway" was not necessary. The instruction is confusing and therefore prejudicial in that it implies
that Kenneth Spendlove might have driven his automobile on his own right side of the highway and not
be negligent under paragraph D of the instruction
and yet in some manner be negligent under paragraph C. It is not surprising that the jury returned
a verdict in the plaintiff's favor in the action brought
for the death of Connie Spendlove. Having been instructed as they were in Instruction 24 in spite of
the lack of evidence of negligence on the part of Kenneth Spendlove given a choice of five ways in which
they might find Spendlove negligent would have required a great deal of astuteness on their part to determine that at least four of the charges of negligence
did not pertain to and had nothing to do with this
accident. For the reasons given, we feel the court committed prejudicial error in giving Instruction No. 24
especially when that instruction was immediately
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followed by Instruction No. 24 (A) which incorpor- I
ated 24 and said:

"Before you can return a verdict for the I
plaintiff because of the death of Connie De- I
Mille, you must find by a preponderance of the I
eyi.dence that each of the following two propo- I
s1 tions are true :
"A. That the defendant's decedent Mr.
Spendlove was negligent in the operation of
the automobile he was driving at the time and
place of the said collision in one or more of the
particulars as mentioned herein above.
~'B. That such negligence of Mr. Spendlove, if any, was the proximate cause of said
collision.
"In this connection you are instructed
that plaintiff has the burden of proving each
of the above and foregoing propositions by
such preponderance of the evidence."
CONCLUSION

All of the persons involved in this accident were
killed. There was no evidence as to how the accident
had occurred except that it is known that the De·
Milles were on their way to Las Vegas, the damage
to the two automobiles in question, and the physical
marks left on the highway at or after the point of
impact. On the basis of this evidence it is reasonable 1
to infer that this was a head-on collision between the I
DeMille vehicle, which was traveling south, and the
Spendlove vehicle, which would have to be traveling
north, and that the accident occurred by reason of the
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fact that the DeMille vehicle was 31/2 to 4 feet onto
the wrong side of the road at the time of impact.
There is no evidence whatsoever as to what happened
up to the time of impact. There is no evidence that
Frederick Kenneth Spendlove ever drove his automobile onto the wrong side of the highway. There is
no evidence that the drivers were traveling at an excessive rate of speed; did not have their automobiles
under control; or that Frederick Kenneth Spendlove
could have avoided the accident by turning his automobile to the right. Under such circumstances it was
error on the part of the court to deny the appellant's
motion for a directed verdict. The plaintiff had failed
to sustain his burden of proving negligence on the
part of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove, who being
dead is presumed to have been exercising due care,
by a preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless,
the court submitted the case to the jury specifying
five grounds of negligence. Under that instruction
: the jury were asked to speculate as to whether or not
Frederick Kenneth Spendlove was keeping a reasonable lookout, keeping his car under reasonable control, driving on the wrong side of the road, or could
have turned to the right and avoided the accident.
There being no evidence in the case from which such
inferences could be made, it was error on the part of
the trial court to so instruct the jury. Since the plaintiff did fail to sustain his burden of proof as to negligence on the part of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove,
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
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judgment entered in the appellant's favor. The leas( :
which this court should do in order to correct this ,
manifest miscarriage of justice is to grant appellant
a new trial.
1

1
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Respectfully submitted,
HANSON & GARRETT
By Don J. Hanson
Attorneys for Appellant
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